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The continual failure of the Supreme Court to recognize the
right to counsel as a fundamental right is inimical to the tra-
ditional American insistence on personal liberty and equal
justice for all. ' The Court, however, in accordance with its
present liberal view toward individual rights has, through a
series of decisions, attempted to deliniate and define this right.
This has only resulted in confusion and uncertainty which has
in turn placed the rights of the accused in jeopardy2 and the
state prosecutors in a quandary. It is therefore necessary to
examine these decisions in an attempt to determine the extent
of the right as recognized at present. To do this effectively it is
necessary to examine both the extensions and the restrictions
thus far recognized. After the present status of the right is
determined, the bases for further extension can be examined in
the light of the Court's present arguments and concessions.
Judicial Recognition
The right to counsel has been a frequently recurring ques-
tion before the Supreme Court. 3 An analysis of the decisions in
these instances gives a partial understanding of the extent of the
1 Although not recognized as a fundamental right it has been recognized as a right
guaranteed by the sixth amendment and thus essential in federal courts,
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458 (1938). This holding was later codified in the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 18 U. S. C. A. Rule 44: "Assignment of
Counsel. If the defendant appears in court without counsel, the court shall
advise him of his right to counsel and assign counsel to represent him at
every stage of the proceeding unless he elects to proceed without counsel or is
able to obtain counsel."
2 This is evinced by the realization that the many right to counsel cases heard by
the Supreme Court represent but a fraction of the requests for writs of
certiorari.
3 "The substantial body of case law testifies that the counsel problem is more than
an academic one. It has vexed the United States Supreme Court more than
many of seemingly greater magnitude." BEANEY, THE RIGHT TO
COUNSEL IN AMERICAN COURTS (1955), quoted in New York Bar,
EQUAL JUSTICE FOR THE ACCUSED (1959), p. 43.
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right to counsel today. But, since this right has not been abso-
lutely recognized by the Supreme Court it must be categorized,
for an understanding examination, as follows: (1) right to
obtain counsel; (2) right to appointment of counsel; (3) right
to competent counsel; (4) right to counsel for appeal; (5) right
to waive counsel. Inasmuch as these last three categories are
dearly separable aspects of the problem, and not within the
scope of this paper, they will not be discussed.
Right to Obtain Counsel
The right of the accused to obtain his own counsel is as
ancient as the American concept of due process of law.4 But
that is the limit of its antiquity; for apparent as the right must
now appear, it was not recognized in England until the passage
of the Trials for Felonies Act in 1836.5 Nevertheless, the Con-
stitutions of twelve of the original states, as well as the Federal
Constitution, were written with provisions for this right.(
The right to obtain counsel, then, presents no problem other
than the inevitable one of whether the accused was actually
afforded the right and the opportunity to exercise it. The right
dearly exists and there are no Supreme Court decisions contra. 7
4 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45, 68 (1932); Cooke v. U. S., 267 U. S. 517, 537
(1924).
5 6 & 7 Will. 4, c. 114, §§ I and II; PLUNCKNETT, CONCISE HISTORY OF
THE COMMON LAW (2nd Ed. 1936).
6 Virginia was the colony without provision for counsel. An illustrative example of
these early provisions, is found in the Pennsylvania Charter of Privileges(1701): "That all criminals shall have the same Privileges of Witnesses and
council as their Prosecutors." For the other early American Constitutional
doctrines on provisions for the right of counsel see 1 COOLEY, CON-
STITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS (8th ed. Carrington, 1927) 696-708.
7 Chandler v. Fretag, 348 U. S. 3 (1954). But a problem closely analogous to right
to appointment of counsel arises on the question of obtaining counsel for pre-
trial aid. Cicencia v. La Gay, 357 U. S. 504 (1958); Crooker v. California, 357
U. S. 433 (1958) (in both of these cases it was held not to be a denial of due
process despite denial of request by the accused to obtain pre-trial counsel,
there were strong dissents in both as indicated by 5-3 and 5-4 votes). A later
case, Spano v. New York, 360 U. S. 328 (1959) held a confession, obtained
after request by accused for his counsel was denied, to be illegally obtained.
But in concurring opinions Justices Douglas, Black, Breenan, and Stewart
emphasize right to counsel, stating "[d]epriving a person, formally charged
with a crime, of counsel during the period prior to trial may be more damaging
than denial of counsel during the trial itself."
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Right to Appointment of Counsel
The right to appointment of counsel is the eye of the storm
of uncertainty. Here there are numerous arguments both for
and against the inclusion of the right within the protection of
the Fourteenth Amendment. But the intent at this point is not
to present the arguments; rather it is to determine the present
scope of the right. This requires practically a case by case
examination, since the Court has decided each case primarily
upon its own peculiar facts.
The first Supreme Court case holding that in certain in-
stances the state must appoint counsel is Powell v. Alabama, 8
more commonly known as the "Scottsboro Cases". The Court
decided with broad language that at least in such an extreme
case there was a fundamental right to the aid of counsel. With-
out the occasional references to the capital nature of the crime
and the extreme need for counsel this case would have resolved
the question in one sweep. But, in accord with our system of
law, the opinion was only precedent to the extent it was neces-
sary to decide the case.,
Only ten years later Betts v. Brady1 0 severely limited the
sweeping statements made in the Powell case. In this case de-
fendant was an ordinarily intelligent man of forty-three who
was charged with robbery. He requested counsel but his
request was denied. He then conducted his own defense but
was convicted and sentenced to eight years imprisonment. The
Court found that, historically, appointment of counsel was not
mandatory for a fair trial and due process. In this case it was
also noted that the defendant had been in court before and was
not "wholly unfamiliar with criminal procedure". The test
used was succinctly stated by Mr. Justice Roberts:
8 287 U. S. 45 (1932). The defendants, nine young, illiterate, non-resident negroes
were charged with the rape of two white girls. They pleaded not guilty, were
arraigned, tried, and sentenced to death all in one day without the benefit of
counsel.
9 The Court will not "... formulate a rule of constitutional law, broader than is
required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied." Liverpool, N. Y.
and P. S. S. Co. v. Emigration Commissioners, 113 U. S. 33, 39 (1884).
10 316 U. S. 455 (1942).
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As we have said, the Fourteenth Amendment pro-
hibits the conviction and incarceration of one whose
trial is offensive to the common and fundamental ideas
of fairness and right, and while want of counsel in a par-
ticular case may result in a conviction lacking in such
fundamental fairness, we cannot say that the Amend-
ment embodies an inexorable command that no trial for
any offense, or in any court, can be fairly conducted and
justice accorded a defendant who is not represented by
counsel. 11
This sets the standard as one of fundamental fairness. A trium-
virate of Justices, Black, Murphy, and Douglas, presented
their first of many dissents in this case. '2
Since the Brady case the question of right to counsel has
been principally decided by the Court twenty-three times, this
in a period of 18 years. This alone must corroborate the
alleged insufficiency of the Court's "fair trial" test. For were the
test definable, prosecutors and state courts would apply it to
preclude reversal or, if they did not apply it, the Supreme
Court could reverse Summarily. 13
In 1945 three cases were heard; each was held a denial of due
process. In the first of these a denial of request for counsel '4
and in the second the refusal of a motion for a continuance in
order to obtain counsel 'r were held denials of due process. In
the Hawk case the charge was murder; and Mr. Justice Reed in
answer to a contention of fairness stated, .... the importance
of the assistance of counsel in a serious criminal charge after
arraignment is too large to permit speculation on its effect." 16
1" Id. at 473.
12 Id. at 474. Mr. Justice Rutledge concurred with these three in later dissenting
opinions.
1 Cf.,Hart, "The Supreme Court 1958 Term," 73 Harv.L.Rev. 84,88 (1960).
14 House v. Mayo, 324 U. S. 42 (1945). In this case the Florida court had forced
defendant to answer charges without counsel despite his request.
25 Hawk v. Olson, 326 U. S. 271 (1945). Here petitioner was held incommunicado
until arraignment, and charge was for a capital offense, thus the Powell case
was precedent.
16 Id. at 278.
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The third 1945 right to counsel case, Rice v. Olson,1 7held due
process was denied as a result of the complexities of the case.
The following year two right to counsel cases were heard,
but in neither was there found to be a denial of due process.
And neither case added substantially to the definition of the
right, because the majority found a presence of counsel in
one 18 and a waiver of counsel in the other. 19 Both cases have
strong dissenting opinions in which lack of counsel is urged as
denial of due process.
In Foster v. Illinois 2 oMr. Justice Frankfurter found that the
defendants had not been denied due process because they had
been sufficiently advised, in view of their ages (34 and 48), to
make an adequate defense. The same year a majority of the
Court affirmed a similar case on the basis of improper procedure
by the appellant. 21 However, the Court in per curiam opinions
found denials of due process in two later cases in 1947.22
Since the 1947 term only three cases have found due pro-
cess, despite denial of counsel, and in each of these cases the
customary strong dissent was present. 2 3 In these the majority
found no exceptional circumstances which required the assis-
I7 324 U. S. 786 (1945). This involved an Indian charged with burglary; the case
was complicated by a problem of jurisdiction relating to Winnebago Indian
Reservation.
18 Canizio v. New York, 327 U. S. 82 (1946) (defendant had counsel for long hear-
ings during the two days preceding sentencing).
19 Carter v. Illinois, 329 U. S. 156 (1946) (counsel appointed for sentence hearing).
20 332 U. S. 134 (1947). The court did not advise defendants of their right to
counsel; they were convicted and given indeterminate sentences. The dissent
by Justices Black, Douglas, Murphy, and Rutledge urges an argument of
equal protection as well as due process.
21 Gayes v. New York, 332 U. S. 145 (1947). The same justices, as in the Foster
case, again dissent.
22 Marino v. Ragen, 332 U. S. 561 (1947); De Meerleer v. Michigan, 329 U. S.
663 (1947). In both cases the defendants were under 21, unfamiliar with trial
procedure, and the charges were murder.
23 Bute v. Illinois, 333 U. S. 640 (1948) (defendant charged with incest and sen-
tenced to life as a habitual criminal); Gryger v. Burke, 334 U. S. 728 (1948)
(defendant pleaded guilty and was sentenced to life as a habitual criminal);
Quicksall v. Michigan, 339 U. S. 660 (1950) (defendant pleaded guilty to
murder and sentenced to life, maximum in Michigan).
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tance of counsel to insure a fair trial. The accused was over
forty years old and of normal intelligence in each instance. The
presumption of regularity in the trial was also raised to add
strength to the argument for due process. But not with-
standing these arguments Quicksall v. Michigan 2 4 was the last
case in which a trial was found sufficiently fair to satisfy due
process when counsel was not provided.
Eleven times in the past thirteen years the Supreme Court
has held a denial of counsel to be a violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Of these all but Chandler v. Fretag 25 involved a
question of need for counsel in order to obtain fundamental
fairness. Two tests were principally employed to find lack of a
fair trial in these cases. These were whether (1) the complexity
of the trial or (2) the lack of capability in the accused to defend
himself made the aid of counsel essential. Of course, the two
elements were often somewhat inter-related but one of them
was usually recognized as controlling.
Gibbs v. Burke 26 is representative of the "complexity"
decisions. 2 7 In this case the defendant was charged with lar-
ceny and had been convicted six times previously in the same
court. In spite of his "experience" the Court found he needed
counsel because there were grounds upon which counsel could
have impeached the testimony of a damaging witness. The
doctrine established in Betts v. Brady 2 8 was followed in this
case, but was also expanded by further definition. justices
Black and Douglas, however, in their concurring opinion,
advocated over-ruling the Brady case.
24 339 U. S. 660 (1950).
25 348 U. S. 3 (1954). In this case a middle-aged negro was denied an opportunity
to obtain his own counsel; the Court speaking of the Powell holding stated at
page 10: "a necessary corollary is that a defendant must be given a reasonable
opportunity to employ and consult with counsel; otherwise, the right to be
heard by counsel would be of little worth."
26 337 U. S. 773 (1949).
27 In re Oliver, 333 U. S. 257 (1948); Townsend v. Burke, 334 U. S. 736 (1948);
Pennsylvania ex rel. Herman v. Claudy, 350 U. S. 116 (1956).
28 316 U. S. 455 (1942) (established test of fundamental fairness).
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The test of the accused's ability to defend himself is illustra-
ted by Uveges v. Pennsylvania," in which a seventeen year old
boy pleaded guilty to a charge of burglary and was sentenced to
twenty to forty years imprisonment. He was neither offered
counsel nor advised of his right to obtain counsel. In view of
the accused's youth, this was held to be a denial of due process.
The Court recognized that the Fourteenth, as well as the Fifth
Amendment, requires counsel for all persons charged with a
serious offense whenever counsel is necessary for an adequate
defense. This test as applied to the accused's ability has been
employed, to find lack of fairness, in several subsequentcases. 3 o
A recent case 31 incorporates the two elements. The trial
was complex; the accused was young and inexperienced in
trial procedure. Consequently, counsel was held a necessary
requisite to a fair trial. The present extent of the right as
recognized in this latest case was well summarized by Mr.
Justice Reed:
Where the gravity of the crime and other factors-
such as the age and education of the defendant, the
conduct of the court or the prosecuting officials, and the
complicated nature of the offense charged and the pos-
sible defense thereto-render criminal proceedings with-
out counsel so apt to result in injustice as to be funda-
mentally unfair, the constitution requires that the ac-
cused must have legal assistance at his trial. 32
From these cases it can be seen that the Court has con-
sistently followed its "fair trial" rule. The difficulty lies in
defining "fair trial"; this has led to different results in very
29 335 U. S. 437 (1948). Mr.Justice Frankfurterin his dissenting opinion at442 states,
..after all, this is the Nations ultimate judicial tribunal, not a super-legal-aid
bureau." Perhaps Mr. Justice Frankfurter would also object to the simile, 'a
super-legal-guardian-bureau', but, in accord with the Court's function as inter-
preters and guarantors of Constitutional rights, the objection would appear
unjustified.
30 Wade v. Mayo, 334 U. S. 672 (1948); Palmer v. Ashe, 342 U. S. 134 (1951);
Massey v. Moore, 348 U. S. 105 (1954); Moore v. Michigan, 355 U. S. 155
(1957).
31 Cash v. Culver, 358 U. S. 633 (1959).
32 Uveges v. Pennsylvania, 335 U. S. 437, 441 (1948) approved in Cash v. Culver,
358 U. S. 633, 637 (1959).
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similar cases. In general, however, the Court has reversed for a
denial of right to counsel whenever the trial proceedings were
so complex as to require the aid of counsel 3 3 or whenever the
charge was a serious offense 34 and especially when it was a
capital offense. 3 5 When a defendant without counsel was not
assisted by the court 36 or whenever intentional or uninten-
tional deception by the court misled the defendant,37 then the
Court has held the conviction to be void. Where a defendant
without counsel was uneducated,38 ignorant, 3 9 or mentally
unstable 40 his conviction has been held unconstitutional.
Young defendants must always be provided counsel.41 The
defendant must be allowed to hire his own counsel 42 and his
counsel must be permitted to be present at every stage of the
trial.4a
Despite the recognition by the Supreme Court of these
many extensions of the right to counsel in the state courts the
majority still refuses to recognize it as fundamental. However
they do believe that in federal courts, "[t]he right to have the
assistance of counsel is too fundamental and absolute to
allow the courts to indulge in nice calculations as to the
33 Moore v. Michigan, 355 U. S. 155 (1957); Pennsylvania ex rel. Herman v.
Claudy, 350 U. S. 116 (1956); Rice v. Olson, 324 U. S. 786 (1945); Tomkins
v. Missouri, 323 U. S. 485 (1945); Williams v. Kaiser, 323 U. S. 471 (1945).
34 This has never been held sufficient in itself but is a strong influencing factor.
3 Moore v. Michigan, 355 U. S. 155 (1957); Marino v. Ragen, 332 U. S. 561
(1947); De Meerleer v. Michigan, 329 U. S. 663 (1947); Tomkins v. Missouri
323 U. S. 485 (1945); Williams v. Kaiser, 323 U. S. 471 (1945).
38 Gibbs v. Burke, 337 U. S. 773 (1949).
37 Palmer v. Ashe, 342 U. S. 134 (1951); Townsend v. Burke, 334 U. S. 736 (1948);
Smith v. O'Grady, 312 U. S. 329 (1941).
38 Moore v. Michigan, 355 U. S. 155 (1957); Herman v. Claudy, 350 U. S. 116
(1956).
39 Reece v. Georgia, 350 U. S. 85 (1955); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45 (1932).
40 Massey v. Moore, 348 U. S. 105 (1954); Palmer v. Ashe, 342 U. S. 134 (1951).
41 Moore v. Michigan, 355 U. S. 155 (1957); Uveges v. Pennsylvania, 335 U. S.
437 (1948); Wade v. Mayo, 334 U. S. 672 (1948); Powell v. Alabama, 287
U. S. 45 (1932).
42 Chandler v. Fretag, 348 U. S. 3 (1954); Hawk v. Olson, 326 U. S. 271 (1945);
House v. Mayo, 324 U. S. 42 (1945).
43 Chessman v. Teets, 354 U. S. 156 (1957).
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amount of prejudice arising from its denial,4 4" but ostensibly
this is a chameleon like right which takes on a different color
when in the state courts.
Bases for Extension
The illusive test applied by the Supreme Court has proved
to be untenable and irrational. It is utterly impossible to tell at
any given time what the law would be in a specific instance.
This is all the more evident when it is realized that the majority
of these decisions were by 5-4 or 6-3 votes. Continual and
consistent uncertainty is indicative of an insufficient state of
law. This uncertainty has been notably absent in the federal
courts. Rule 44 45 has codified a Supreme Court decision,46
which held that right to counsel in the federal courts includes
right to appointment of counsel; since this is true for the
federal courts it must surely be true for the state courts where
right to counsel is recognized but ill-defined. Can right to
counsel logically mean different things to the same court,
dependent only upon where the case was heard? The answer
must, of course, be in the negative; but recognizing the prin-
ciples of our court system it becomes dear that logic alone
cannot move the Court. 47 Thus, the possible historical bases
for inclusion of right to counsel in the Fourteenth Amendment
must be presented as well as the logical bases. And since right
to counsel is dependent on the meaning of the Amendment
this meaning must be sought first through legislative intent
and judicial decision. Then, if this fails, a more practical and
specific examination of the right and its exigencies must be
made.
44 Glasser v. United States, 315 U. S. 60, 76 (1942).
45 Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 18 U. S. C. A. Rule 44.
46 Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458 (1938). Another problem, that of competence
of counsel, is present in the federal courts to some extent. This is largely due
to the absence of any method of compensating appointed counsel, while this
is a collateral problem it is one of recognizable significance. See, Johnson v.
United States, 11 F. 2nd 562 (D. C. Cit. 1940); Baldwin v. United States, 141
F. Supp. 310 (E.D.S.C. 1956).
47 Adamson v. California, 332 U. S. 46, 51-54, 59-67 (1947); Betts v. Brady, 316
U. S. 455, 464 (1942).
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Intent of the Framers
Any question of constitutional interpretation must begin
with a search for the intent of the framers. In this instance the
question must be what was intended by Congress when the
draft of the Fourteenth Amendment was first presented in
December, 1865, and when passed by Congress on July 16,
1866. The best source of this intent may be found in the
debates over passage of the Amendment. From the debates it
is clear that even then the Amendment meant different things to
different persons both among its proponents and its opponents.
To Senator Jacob Howard it carried broad meaning, in present-
ing the joint resolution proposing adoption of the Amend-
ment he pointed out that the citizens of each of the states had
long enjoyed "a mass of privileges, immunities, and rights,
some of them secured by the second section of the fourth
article of the Constitution... , some by the first eight amend-
ments of the Constitution;" but that these privileges, immuni-
ties, and rights were protected only from legislation by Con-
gress and not from legislation by the several states. The Sena-
tor continued:
The great object of the first section of this amend-
ment is, therefore, to restrain the power of the states and
compel them at all times to respect these great funda-
mental guarantees ... disable a state from depriving
not merely a citizen of the United States, but any person,
whoever they may be, of life, liberty, or property with-
out due process of law, or from denying to him the equal
protection of the laws of the state. This abolishes all
class legislation in the States and does away with the in-
justice of subjecting one caste of persons to a code not
applicable to another ... It establishes equality before
the law, and it gives to the humblest, the poorest, and
most despised of the race the same rights and the same
protection before the law as it gives to the most power-
ful, the most wealthy, or the most haughty... 48
Fifteen days earlier on May 8, 1866, Representative Thaddeus
Stevens had said:
48 142 Congressional Globe 2803 (May 23, 1866).
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The first section [of the Amendment] prohibits the
States from abridging the privileges and immunities of
citizens of the United States or unlawfully depriving
them of life, liberty, or property, or of denying to any
person within their jurisdiction the "equal" protection
of the laws.
I can hardly believe that any person can be found who
will not admit that every one of these provisions is just.
They are all asserted, in some form or other, in our dec-
laration or organic law. But the Constitution limits only
the action of Congress, and is not a limitation on the
States. This amendment supplies that defect, and allows
Congress to correct the unjust legislation of the States,
so far that the law which operates upon one man shall
operate equally upon all. 4 9
These statements of Senator Howard and Mr. Stevens un-
questionably represented the official attitude of the Republican
majority in Congress, and were substantially repeated by other
Republicans in speeches and debates. But this reveals little.
Because of the broad terms used, the Amendment is scarcely
further defined.
Others among the legislators restricted their statements of
intent almost exclusively to problems of the Negro. Carl
Schurz stated that the Amendment was "intended to engraft
the main provisions of the Civil Rights Act upon the Consti-
tution" and this formed "a necessary complement of the
abolition of slavery."5 o Other editorial and judicial comments
spoke to the same effect. Mr. Justice Miller, in delivering the
opinion of the Court in the Slaughter House Cases, said:
We repeat, then, in the light of this recapitulation of
events, almost too recent to be called history, but which
are familiar to us all; and on the most casual examination
of the language of these amendments [the thirteenth,
fourteenth, and fifteenth], no one can fail to be im-
pressed with the one pervading purpose found in them
49 142 Congressional Globe 2460 (May 8, 1866).
50 19 Atlantic Monthly 221 (March, 1867).
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all, lying at the foundation of each, and without which
none of them would have been even suggested; we mean
freedom of the slave race, the security and firm establish-
ment of that freedom, and the protection of the newly
made freeman and citizen from the oppressions of those
who had formerly exercised unlimited dominion over
him. 51
The foregoing summary, while by no means extensive, is
sufficient to establish that the one undisputed purpose of the
framers of the Fourteenth Amendment was to complete the
work of emancipation and that a large majority of its sup-
porters and opponents believed that its principal, and to some
its only, effect would be to confer additional rights and im-
munities on members of the Negro race.
Judicial Interpretation
Since passage of the Amendment it has been defined by the
Court in far over a thousand decisions. A look at a sampling of
these decisions will readily reveal that the Court has never pre-
cisely determined the meaning. Thus, the amendment pro-
tected Wong Kim Ark, the American-born son of Chinese sub-
jects, when he was refused permission to land at San
Francisco on returning to this country from a visit to China, r 2
but not John Elk, an American Indian, when he was denied the
right to register as a voter in the Fifth Ward of Omaha; s 3 the
Indianapolis Water Company against the water rates fixed by
the Public Service Commission,54 but not Knoxville Water
Company against the water rates fixed by the City of Knox-
ville; .s August Bartels against the penalties imposed upon him
by an Iowa statute for teaching German to children in a
parochial school,5, but not Albert W. Hamilton against a
regulation of the University of California requiring him to take
51 16 Wallace 36, 71 (1873).
52 U. S. v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U. S. 649 (1898).
53 Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U. S. 94 (1884).
54 McCart v. Indianapolis Water Co., 302 U. S. 419 (1938).
55 City of Knoxville v. Knoxville Water Company, 221 U. S. 1 (1908).
56 Bartels v. State of Iowa, 262 U. S. 404 (1923).
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a course in military science and tactics; r 7Yick Wo, a subject of
the Emperor of China, when he was imprisoned in San Francisco
for engaging in the laundry business in a frame building, 5 8 but
not Soon Hing, also a Chinese subject, when he was imprisoned
in the same city for engaging in the laundry business between
the hours often p.m. and six a. m.; 59 L. A. Nixon, a Negro,
when he was prohibited by a Texas statute from voting in a
primary election in that state, 0 but not R. R. Grovey, also a
Negro, when he was prohibited by the resolution of a party
convention from voting in a similar election in the same state; 6'
Joseph Tipaldo when he was indicted for failing to comply with
the provisions of the New York Minimum Wage Act, 62 but
not West Coast Hotel Company when it was sued by Elsie
Parrish, a chambermaid in its employ, for the difference be-
tween the wages which she had actually received and the
amount to which she was entitled under the provisions of the
Washington Minimum Wage Act; 63Yetta Stromberg when
she directed the children in a summer camp in a ritual which
consisted of raising a red flag and pledging allegiance to the
cause for which the flag stood,64 but not Benjamin Gitlow
when he arranged for the publication of a manifesto advo-
cating the forcible overthrow of the established political system
of the United States;65 and L. D. Harris, an illiterate Negro,
against a confession obtained by extensive and uninterrupted
interrogation, 66 but not Agapita Gallegos, a Mexican boy,
who spoke no English and was illegally detained until he con-
fessed. 67
5 Hamilton v. University of California, 293 U. S. 245 (1934).
58 Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356 (1886).
59 Soon Hing v. Crowley, 113 U. S. 703 (1885).
60 Nixon v. Condon, 286 U. S. 73 (1932); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U. S. 536 (1927).
61 Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U. S. 45 (1935).
62 Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U. S. 587 (1936); Id., 299 U. S.
619 (1937).
63 West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U. S. 379 (1937).
64 Stromberg v. California, 283 U. S. 359 (1931).
65 Gidow v. New York, 268 U. S. 45 (1935).
66 Harris v. South Carolina, 338 U. S. 68 (1949).
67 Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U. S. 55 (1951).
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These illustrations are not given to show any supposed or
real conflict in the Court's decisions nor to criticize the Court,
but to emphasize three clear and undeniable conclusions: (1)
in many instances the Amendment does not mean what its
proponents intended: (2) in even more instances it does mean
what its proponents never intended; (3) no distinct and ex-
clusive meaning has yet been given to the Amendment.
The foregoing discussion is not intended to imply in any
way that the Court has erred or that it has attempted or should
attempt to precisely define the Fourteenth Amendment. It
does, however, lead to the conclusion that it is unproductive
and in fact impolitic to look either to the intent of the framers
or to judicial decisions for a precise definition of either the
Fourteenth Amendment or the Due Process Clause included
therein. But this is what the Court has in many instances
done.; 8 As Mr. Justice Roberts expressed it in seeking an
answer to a question of the scope of the Amendment:
Relevant data on the subject are afforded by con-
stitutional and statutory provisions subsisting in the
colonies and the states prior to the inclusion of the Bill
of Rights, in the national Constitution, and in the con-
stitutional, legislative, and judicial history of the States
to the present date. These constitute the most authori-
tative sources for ascertaining the considered judgment
of the citizens of the States upon the question. 69
It is not questioned that these sources should be looked to but
it does border on absurdity for the Court to become tied
slavishly to them after they have repeatedly failed to give an
adequate answer. The insufficiency of the answer found in such
sources is indicated by the decisive split in the Court's inter-
pretation of these sources 7 0 and in the arguments (now chiefly
68 Adamson v. California, 332 U. S. 46 (1947); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S.
319 (1937); Twining v. NewJersey, 211 U. S. 78 (1908); Hurtado v. California,
110 U. S. 516 (1884).
69 Betts v. Brady, 316 U. S. 455, 465 (1942).
70 For a fairly representative example of this see, Adamson v. California, 332 U. S.
46 (1947) and Mr.Justice Black's dissent at 68.
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academic) of legal writers. 71 Such background alone cannot
justify either the inclusion or exclusion of the right to counsel
under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Law of the Land
All law, even constitutional law, is not static but pro-
gressive and is to be construed with respect to social conditions
and enlightened public policy. 72 This necessitates considering
the rights and needs of society as well as those of the individual
in determining whether right to counsel is a protected right.
Some may still throw up their hands aghast at such a procedure,
but the reality of this consideration has long permeated the
judiciary and is commonly accepted today. Mr. Justice Holmes
recognized it eighty years ago:
The very considerations which judges most rarely
mention, and always with an apology, are all the juices of
life. I mean, of course, considerations of what is ex-
pedient for the community concerned. 73
In determing what is "expedient for the community con-
cerned" it is necessary to recognize the extent to which the
individual states have themselves recognized their needs and
rights. And by determining this present need for the right and
current recognition of the right, in effect, the "law of the land"
is defined; but courts have generally been in agreement with the
statement that "[d]ue process of law is process due according
to the law of the land." 7 4 This establishes the synonymity of
"due process" and "law of the land." 75 The latter is the older of
the two phrases dating back to the Magna Charta; for this
reason it is often held to apply only to the basic rights recog-
nized in 1215.76 This is fallacious; "law of the land", even then,
71 No attempt will be made here to further belabor this point but see, Fairman,
"Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights," 2 Stan-
ford L. Rev. 5 (1949); Charles Warren, "The New Liberty Under the Four-
teenth Amendment," 39 Harv. L. Rev. 431-65 (1926).
72 16 C.J. S. Con. Law, § 17 (1956).
73 HOLMES, THE COMMONLAW, p.35 (1881).
74 Walkerv. Sanniner, 92U. S. 90, 93 (1875).
75 Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U. S. 312, 316 (1927); Simon v. Craft, 182 U. S. 427
(1901).
76 MOTT, DUE PROCESS OFLAW, (1926).
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applied not to the formalities of common law but to principles
of justice and reasonableness. This was recognized in Hurtado
v. California:
There is nothing in Magna Charta, rightly construed
as a broad charter of public right and law, which ought
to exclude the best ideas of all systems and of every age;
and as it was the characteristic principle of the common
law to draw its inspiration from every fountain of justice,
we are not to assume that the sources of its supply have
been exhausted. On the contrary, we should expect that
the new and various experiences of our own situation
and system will mould and shape it into new and not
less useful forms . . . 7
The phrase itself precludes the contention that its definition
can be totally restricted to the law as it existed in 1215, in 1866,
or at any other time prior to the present. The law of the land
must be a current and evolving thing, to argue conversely is to
compel the conclusion that a great body of our present "law of
the land" is unconstitutional. Coerced confessions,7s de-
prival of the right to vote, 7 9 deprival of freedom of speech, a o
as well as numerous other examples of arbitrary state action
should then have been upheld, since they were neither recog-
nized as the law of the land in 1215 nor by the framers in 1866.
Or, would anyone seriously contend that it is not the law of the
land that states may not subject the accused to double jeopardy?
Yet there would be no historical basis or judicial precedent for
such a holding; that this would be a question of first impression
was recognized by Mr. Justice Cardozo in Palko v. Connecticut
"[w]hat the answer would have to be if the state were permitted
after a trial free from error to try the accused over again or to
bring another case against him, we have no occasion to con-
sider."81 This point has never been considered;82 but, if it
77 110 U. S. 516, 531 (1884).
78 Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U. S. 278 (1936).
79 United States, exrel. Turner v. Fisher, 222 U.S. 204 (1911).
80 Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U. S. 380 (1927).
81 302 U. S. 319 (1937).
82 This is not to be confused with the Constitutional challenge to successive state
and federal prosecutions based upon the same transaction or conduct.
Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U. S. 121 (1959).
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were to come before the Supreme Court, the most expedient
tests of inclusion would appear to be: (1) is the right now a part
of the law of the land (i. e. is it now generally accepted as a
necessary aspect of due process) and (2) aside from social
policy, is it a necessary and fundamental right. These are also
the most feasible tests for the vexatious right to counsel prob-
lem. 83
Right to counsel is presently recognized to some degree by
every state. 84 Among these the extent of the recognition varies
greatly as to time of appointment, manner of appointment, and
as to the type of crime requiring counsel. But generally, only
seven states appoint counsel exclusively for capital crimes;8,
seven appoint counsel only for felonies; 86 and seven states
provide for counsel in most or all crimes, but only at the
discretion of the court.8 7  Of the remaining twenty-seven
who require appointment of counsel for essentially all crimes,
twenty have mandatory appointment upon the request of the
accused,8s while the remaining seven require appointment of
83 Although this discussion may appear to border on a venture in semantics it must
be recognized that no synonyms have precisely the same meaning and since
law deals largely with shades and degrees these nice variations can be of some
importance.
84 Alaska and Hawaii provisions are not considered in this analysis.
85 Ala. Code 1940, Tide 15, § 318, 382; Fla. Stat. Ann. 1955, §§ 909.21, 924.17,
924.23; Mass. Laws Ann. 1956, Ch. 276, § 37A; Miss. Code Ann. 1956, §2505;
Pa. Stars. Ann. 1957, Tit. 19 §§ 783, 784; R. I. General Laws 1956, §§12-15-1-
12-15-7; S. C. Code 1952, §§ 17-506, 17-507.
8 Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. 1956, §§ 13-161, 13-1673, 13-1721; Ark. Star. Ann. 1947,
§§ 43-1203, 43-2415; La. Rev. Star. Ann. 1950, §§ 15: 142-143; Me. Rev.
Star. Ann. 1954, Ch. 148 §11; N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann. 1955, §§ 604, 604.2-3;
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 1953, §§ 2941.50-.51; Va. Code Ann. 1950 §§ 14-181,
19-214.1.
87 Col. Rev. Stat. Ann. 1953, §§ 39-7-29-31; Del. Code Ann. 1953, §§ 11, 5103; Md.
Code Ann. 1957, Art. 26, §§ 11, 12; Mich. Star. Ann. 1954, §§ 28.854, 28.1253;
N. C. Gen. Star. 1955, § 15.4; Tex. Code Ann. 1954, § 494; Vt. Rev. Stat. 1947,
Tit. 9, § 2397.
88 Cal. Pen. Code, §§ 859, 987; Ga. Code Ann. 1947 § 27-3001; Idaho Code Ann.
1947, §19-1512; Iowa Code Ann. 1946, §775: 4-6; Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. 1955,
§ 455.010; Minn. Star. Ann. 1945, §611.07; Mo. State Ann. 1953, § 545.820;
Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. 1947, § 94-6512; Laws of Nev. 1957, Ch. 36, p. 60;
N.J. Star. Ann. 1951, Tit. 2A, 5163-1; N. Y. Code of Cr. Proc., § 308; N. D.
Rev. Code 1943, §27-0831; Okla. Stat. Ann. 1937, Tit. 19, § 134; Ore. Rev.
Star. 1955, § 135.310, 135.320; S. D. Code 1939, § 34.1901; Tenn. Code Ann.
1956, §§ 40-121, 40-2001; Utah Code Ann. 1953, § 77-22-12; Wash. Rev. Code
1956, 10.01.110; Wis. Star. Ann. 1958, §H 957.26, 256.49; Wyo. Comp. Stat.
Ann. 1945, § 10-805.
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counsel with or without the request of the accused. 8 9 Sum-
marized, only fourteen states (those appointing only for capital
crimes and those appointing only at the court's discretion) do
not require appointment of counsel in any but the most
grievous instances. In addition to this general legislative rec-
ognition of the right to appointment of counsel, 0 four states
have also made provision for this right in their constitutions. 91
These statutory provisions by the states must be accepted as at
least indicia of acceptance of the right as an integral part of the
needs and policy of the community.
State case law indicates that right to counsel is generally
included in the phrase "law of the land". As stated in a Vir-
ginia case:
The phrase "law of the land" as used above [in a
constitutional provision for the type of trial] has been
construed to mean that no person in a criminal case shall
be denied the right to the assistance of counsel of his
own selection and that no person indicted for an in-
famous offense who is financially unable to engage
counsel shall be denied the aid of counsel if this fact is
brought to the attention of the trial judge. 92
This broad statement does not stand as an exception to the
general rule but is widely accepted as a proper meaning of "law
of the land" as it pertains to this right. 9 3 There is, of course, no
unanimity among the states but if this were a pre-requisite to
89 Conn. Rev. Gen. Star. 1949, §§ 8796, 3615; Ill. Ann. Stats. 1957, Ch. 38, § 730;
Ind. Star. Ann. 1933, § 9-3501; Kan. Gen. Star. Ann. 1949, Ch. 62 § 1304;
Nebr. Rev. Stat. 1943, § 29.1803; N. M. Stat. 1953, § 41-11-2; W. Va., Code
Ann. 1955, § 6190.
90 Further evidence of state recognition of right to counsel is given by the states'
position on the collateral problem of right to counsel on appeal. The Council
of State Governments in 1957 and again in 1959 urged that the states re-
evaluate their statutes pertaining to this. SUGGESTED STATE LEGIS-
LATION, 1959, p. 134.
01 Ga. Const. Art I§1; Ind. Const. Art I §13; Ky. Const. §11; N. Y. Const. Art I
§§6, 11.
92 Stonebreaker v. Smyth, 187 Va. 250,46S. E. 2d 406,409 (1948).
03 "The 'law of the land' guarantees one a lawful trial and benefit of counsel
regardless of the crime he commits." Peterson v. State, 145 Fla. 466, 199 So.
753 (1941); Accord, People v. Hoffman, 379 Ill. 318, 40 N. E. 2d 515, 518
(1942).
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acceptance as law then our law would be forever static, un-
adaptive or, if carried to the extreme, almost non-existent.
In fact, it is this very lack of unanimity which results in a lack of
uniformity that is contrary to constitutional guarantees. It is
obviously contrary to our constitutional principles for right to
counsel as recognized by the Supreme Court to have different
meanings in different states, but this has been a result of the fair
trial test. This lack of uniformity tends to depreciate and to rot
away at national citizenship, a right of the people. The Con-
stitution, including its prohibitions on state action, exists for
the benefit of the whole people of the United States. Its in-
terpretation, including the interpretation of its guarantees
against state action concerns the whole people of the United
States. 94. The Supreme Court, as the body charged with the
duty to interpret must, therefore, look to the law of the people
as well as to historical and judicial precedent. As John Mar-
shall's famous statement phrased it, "we must never forget that
it is a constitution we are expounding."95 If this is a proper
admonition then the Supreme Court has erred in failing to
recognize the right to counsel as it has been developed and
accepted into the mores of the people. This failure adversely
affects every person within the protection of the Constitution,
for no one's individual rights to counsel can be restricted with-
out everyone's rights also being restricted to the same degree.
This reaches the inevitable conclusion that a small minority of
persons, who choose not to extend individual rights beyond
1789 or 1866 limits, can preclude extension to all other persons.
This obviously was not the framer's intent, thus the Court, by
limiting its interpretation to the intent of the framers, achieves a
result which obviates the framer's intent.
There is still another reason why society has an interest in
the enforced protection of the right to counsel. Representation
by counsel is a recognized factor in the control of crime. 96 A
realistic discussion of the plight of the accused, not from the
viewpoint of morals but from the calculated requirements of the
94 Admittedly this involves metaphysical problems concerned with Rousseau's
"will of the people" and similar concepts but it is only necessary here to
recognize the abstract right.
95 McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 415, 422 (1819); Cited inJulliard v.
Greenman ("Legal Tender Cases"), 110 U. S. 421, 439 (1884).
96 Callagy, "Legal Aid in Criminal Cases," 42J. of Crim. L., C. & P. S. 589 (1952).
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law is as important to the community as to the accused. When
represented, the accused develops a respect for the law and a
sense of gratification in his assurance of a fair trial. But when
tried without counsel, the accused develops a sense of persecu-
tion by the State, which leads to disrespect for the law and, if
guilty, to a continued life of crime or, if innocent, to the in-
ception of a life of crime.
The social policy and law of the land taken alone would
tend to dictate the inclusion of right to counsel under the
Fourteenth Amendment. This may entail the oft criticized so-
called sociological approach to constitutional interpretation,
that is, the abandonment of what the Framers actually intended
for what the Court now believes the Framers would have in-
tended in the light of current social conditions and develop-
ments. 97 This approach is neither startling nor new but is at
least as old as the Court. 98
Mr. Justice Holmes (considered, by as great a man as Mr.
Justice Cardozo, to be the greatest legal intellect in the history
of the English speaking judiiary)91 believes that "[t]he first
requirement of a sound body of law is that it should correspond
with the actual feelings and demands of the society."a 00 By
this test recognition of the right to counsel, in accord with the
mores of the people, is essential.
Fundamental Rights
An examination of the legal precedent for right to counsel
failed to show that it is a right to be either included or excluded
from the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment. The law of
the people apparently includes the right and condones a
liberal interpretation of the right. Admittedly this establishes
only tenous grounds upon which to invoke the Amendment.
97 Murphy, "The Constitution: Interpretation and Intent," 45 A.B.A.J. 592
(1959).
98 See, "Some Aspects of American Constitutional Law," 53 Harv. L. Rev. 529
(1940).
9 9 HALL, SELECTED WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN NATHAN CARDOZO,
(1947). His acumen was also recognized by Justice Frankfurter, who con-
sidered Holmes the greatest intellect ever to serve on the Supreme Court.
FRANKFURTER, OF LAW AND MEN, (1956).
100 HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW, p. 4 1 (1881).
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But something more compelling than legal technicality can be
presented. The myriad of points to be considered by the Court
does not exclude its responsibility to consider the needs of the
individual as they exist in respect to his personal quest for
justice.
At this point the ambiguities of another glib phrase come
into the discussion. "Fundamental rights", a term of many
meanings to many persons, the Court recognizes and protects
such rights 10 but cannot or will not adequately define them.
If the Court persists in adjudging the right to counsel by an
1866 criteria, then, as previously shown, nothing is to be
gained by further elaboration. But by the very nature of a
constitution it must not be limited to the circumstances at the
time of its framing. Herbert Spencer defined life as "the con-
tinuous adjustment of internal relations to external relations."
When the adjustment ceases to exist, the man is dead. When a
constitution can no longer be adjusted to meet the needs of a
changing society, the constitution is dead. Consequently, it
should be safe to assume that the Court may, as they have in
the past, 102 extend the rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment beyond the scope of the framers. With this
assumption it remains necessary that right to counsel be exam-
ined and found to be so imperative to the individual and our
society as to be a necessary and fundamental right.
It must be apparent to anyone who has had any experience
with criminal courts that an untrained individual without coun-
sel is at the mercy of the court or, as is too often the fact, at the
mercy of the prosecuting attorney. While the prosecutor may
have the interests of justice foremost in his mind, it is at least
equally possible that he may have his approaching re-election
there instead. Without making any claim to generalization, it
may be stated as common knowledge that the prosecuting
technique in the United States is purposed so as to regard a
101 Betts v. Brady, 316 U. S. 455, 473 (1942); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45, 68
(1932).
102 Gidow v. New York, 268 U. S. 652 (1925) (freedom of speech); Hamilton v.
University of California, 293 U. S. 245 (1934) (freedom of religion); Dejonge
v. Oregon, 299 U. S. 353 (1937) (freedom of the press); Wolf v. Colorado,
338 U. S. 25, 27 (1949) (freedom from unreasonable search, by dictum; accord:
Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U. S. 117, 119 (1951); Irvine v. California, 347 U. S
128, 131 (1954).)
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conviction as a personal victory calculated to enhance the
prestige of the prosecutor. Except for occasional instances, this
is not the fault of the prosecutor but is symptomatic of his
environment with its undiscriminating clamor for rapid con-
viction of suspects. This often serves to induce the prosecutor,
who will later campaign on his conviction record, to unques-
tioningly assume guilt and unrelentingly prosecute the person
accused. Under such conditions a prosecutor, with anything
less than the highest ideals, must assume that the end (not
necessarily law of justice, but conviction) is justified by any
means. 103 Many extra-legal and illegal practices have been
developed by prosecutors in accord with this deluded dogma
that the end will sanctify the means.1 0 4 This makes it readily
apparent that the accused needs counsel during and even before
the trial. In conjuntion with guarding against over-zealous
prosecutors (and their distorted Napoleonic tenet-guilty and
not to be proven innocent) 10 5 and third degree police meth-
odg, 3o counsel can aid the accused in certain concrete re-
spects. There are at least ten specific rights and advantages that
the accused can gain from counsel even prior to arraignment,
these are:
(1) The defendant will be consoled by the assurance of
assistance and the fact that he will receive a fair trial.
(2) Evidence may be preserved.
(3) Charges may be made to conform with facts.
(4) Reasonable bail may be obtained or the accused may be
released on his own recognizance.
(5) Evidence from foreign jurisdictions may be obtained in
time for the trial thereby avoiding postponement.
103 See, 76th Cong., 3rd Session 45 (1940) (Hearing before Senate Committee
on judiciary).
104 Roscoe Pound, "Legal Interrogation of Persons Accused or Suspected of
Crime", 24J. Crim. Law 1017 (1924).
105 "It is too much the habit of prosecuting officers to assume beforehand that a
defendant is guilty, and then expect to have the established rules of evidence
twisted, and all the features of a fair trial distorted, in order to secure a con-
viction." People v. Wells, 100 Cal. 459, 465, 34 P. 1078 (1893); quoted in
DOUGLAS, WE THE JUDGES, p. 373 (1956).
106 See, Batt, "EqualJustice for All-Myth or Motto?", 1 W. & M. Law Rev. 325,
333 (1958).
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(6) Removal from prison for questioning or for police
line-up may be avoided.
(7) Evidence not presented at the Magistrates hearing
could be presented to the Grand Jury with the possibility of
having the Bill of Indictment ignored.
(8) An early or delayed listing, in accord with the ac-
cused's need, could be arranged.
(9) Counsel could see that important witnesses were
brought into court.
(10) All charges may be consolidated if that suits the needs
of the accused.
In view of these necessary details requiring action even prior to
trial, it is difficult to see how anyone could logically contend
that the right to counsel is not a necessary and fundamental
right. 107 The fact that the accused who cannot obtain counsel
(usually an indigent) is nearly always imprisoned prior to trial
makes the need greater. Absence of counsel in such an instance
leaves no one free to seek evidence to establish, corroborate,
or refute contended facts, or to seek additional witnesses. This
places the accused at a decided disadvantage in regard to the
prosecutor, and thereby handicaps law and justice.
Once the accused reaches the trial stage in the judicial
process his problems increase and the need for counsel becomes
even more imperative. The deliberative steps to be taken here
are so intricate and consequential that it is inconceivable that
an untrained person could effectually defend himself. Could
an untrained defendant intelligently decide whether to waive a
jury trial, and if he should choose not to, could he intelligently
select a jury? Could he intelligently examine and cross-examine
witnesses; could he intelligently ascertain the need for addi-
tional witnesses; and assuming, arguendo, that he could, could
107 It is so recognized in the federal courts, supra note 1; in the U. S. Military
Courts it is also recognized as a fundamental right, U. S. v. Kantner, 11
USCMA 201, 204, 29 CMR 17 (1960); and in Scodand it is also so recognized,
Chalmers v. H. M. Advocate, (1954) Sess. Cas. 66, 78. And in England an
accused person is entitled to counsel before he talks to the police, he is advised
of this fact and given an opportunity to either obtain counsel or if unable to do
so, to have counsel appointed. Allison, "He Needs a Lawyer Now," 42J. Am.
Jud. Soc'y 113 (1958).
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he then procure the necessary witnesses? Even if the defendant
realized and admitted that he had committed a crime, could he
perceive of, or effectually plead mitigating circumstances, such
as provocation, necessity, absence of specific intent, etc.?
Could he understand the requisites for a plea of self defense,
and would he realize that this would be justification and thus
raised by a plea of not guilty rather than a plea of guilty?
Could he recognize hearsay evidence or any other violation of
the rules of evidence? Would he apprehend and would he be
capable of effectuating the diverse motions necessary to set
aside the verdict, seek an appeal, or request a new trial; could
he discriminatingly select the proper motion even if he were
aware of the existence of these motions? It would be utterly
irrational to answer any of these questions other than in the
negative.
But the die-hards, unwilling to concede that strict con-
struction is as dead as Cato the Elder, will present the sophisti-
cal contention that the judge will guide and assist the accused
in his defense. If this is to be done then our adversary system
must be cast aside and the prosecuting attorney withdrawn
from the case. For what type of legal system is it that would
have adversary proceedings on one side and a non-partial judge
advising the other side, ruling on his own advice, and event-
ually giving the decision? This, in its inception, would dearly
result in a farcical proceeding and as it evolved would lead to a
proceeding atypical of our society but quite typical of police
states.
Even in the instances where the judge does attempt to
serve in such a schizoid manner it is still impossible for the
accused to receive adequate assistance without counsel. For,
in spite of such guidance, there is at least one instance in which
even the most ulteriorly motivated prosecuting attorney and
judge could be of no assistance to the accused. This would
result in the unjust conviction of an accused who had an
absolute defense of insanity. Few persons can recognize their
own insanity much less prove it. A judge, irrespective of his
acumen in law, would be wholly incapable of recognizing the
unexposed defense of insanity. There are many types of in-
sanity, many of which leave the afflicted with periods (often
extended) of normalcy. Therefore, only counsel, by probing
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into the facts of the crime and the background of the accused,
would find symptoms of insanity. Once the issue was raised
the trial would become so technical as to hopelessly preclude a
defendant from conducting his own defense. 1 8
If it is assumed, hypothetically, that the accused is guilty,
with no defenses or mitigating circumstances, and he willingly
admits his guilt (an almost inconceivable situation), does he
then need counsel? The answer must be yes, as a result of
the general progress being made in our criminal law an in-
creasing number of states, by substituting the ideal of re-
habilitative treatment for the old ideal of retribution, have
radically changed the sentencing function of the judge. These
changes have resulted in indeterminate sentences and increased
discretion in the judge. Such procedures make it essential
that the defendant have some one to present facts and speak
for him.
The need of the layman for counsel is summed up by
Mr. Justice Sutherland, with these trenchant words:
Even the intelligent and educated layman has small
and sometimes no skill in the science of law. If charged
with crime, he is incapable, generally, of determining
for himself whether the indictment is good or bad.
He is unfamiliar with the rules of evidence. Left with-
out the aid of counsel he may be put on trial without
a proper charge and convicted upon incompetent
evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue or other-
wise inadmissable. He lacks both the skill and know-
ledge adequately to prepare his defenses, even though
he have a perfect one. He requires the guiding hand of
counsel at every step in the proceedings against him.
Without it, though he be not guilty, he faces the danger
of conviction because he does not know how to
establish his innocence. If that be true of men of
intelligence, how much more true is it of the ignorant
and illiterate, or those of feeble intellect. 1 o 09
108 Cf., Overholser, "Psychiatry's Contributions to Criminal Law and Procedure,"
12 Oklahoma Law Re. 13, 22 (1959).
109 Alabama v. Powell 287 U. S. 45, 69 (1932).
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In discussing the right to counsel it is important to remain
cognizant of the fact that, in accord with our belief in the
innocence of the accused until proven guilty, these are not
criminals but innocent persons who are being denied counsel.
The danger of denying counsel, in the light of this realization,
is poignantly pointed out by Professor Borchard in his analysis
of sixty-five criminal prosecutions and convictions of totally
innocent people. Professor Borchard found that in the majority
of these cases the accused was provided with either no counsel
or inadequate counsel.a 1 This revealing fact makes the
denial of counsel substantially inconsistent with the often
professed abhorrence that an innocent person should ever be
convicted.
The importance of the right to counsel to the individual
should be unquestioned. And, as previously expounded,
everyone has an interest in recognition of this right inasmuch
as restriction of an individual's rights is an equal restriction
of everyone's rights. The need is also vital to society and has
consequently been recognized by the majority of the states.
More compelling reasons for the inclusion of right to
counsel under the Fourteenth Amendment would be difficult
to find. It is certainly a fundamental right, as recognized by
Mr. Justice Douglas in Williams v. Kaiser:
A layman is usually no match for the skilled prose-
cutor whom he confronts in the court room. He needs
the aid of counsel lest he be the victim of overzealous
prosecutors, of the law's complexity, or of his own
ignorance or bewilderment.
These are the reasons why the right to counsel
is "fundamental." 111
In view of the statement it would appear that the court has
recognized right to counsel as a fundamental right and,
consequently, protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.
This is not the fact; the right is still dependent on the "fair
110 BORCHARD, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT, p. XX (1932).
111 323 U. S. 471, 476 (1945).
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trial" test as defined by the decisions previously examined.
This test is inherently weak inasmuch as the only evidence
the appeal court has with which to determine the fairness
of the trial is contained in the record., 12 As has been pointed
out, many aspects of the accused's defense would not appear
on the record. The reviewing court could not hope to as-
certain whether there was a pertinent witness, document, or
other piece of evidence that remained unknown, but which
counsel could have presented at the trial. And without counsel
who is to determine for the accused that a correct and com-
plete record is taken and later presented on appeal? Thus,
in the fair trial test there are an excessive number of unknown
variables which may operate to destroy the validity of the
result and which will operate to destroy the reliability of the
test. The essential result is no test whatsoever.
It is equally mystifying that the Court discards the fair
trial test and unreservedly requires counsel in capital cases
while not requiring it in other cases. This distinction is
absurd. Anthropologists have long realized that many of the
crimes recognized by the people as most abhorrent and
socially dangerous-incest and dope peddling, for examples-
do not exact the death penalty., 13 And psychologists tell
us that for many, a lengthy imprisonment is a much more
severe punishment than death; to still others the imagined
or real social ostracism accompanying conviction is a more
severe castigation than death. 1 14 Other evidence of the
illogical capital crime distinction is found in the Fourteenth
Amendment itself. No distinction is made there between life
and liberty. The distinction made by the Court is wholly
arbitrary from an interpretive standpoint. For the framers
never expressed orally or in writing such a distinction but
rather life and liberty were written into the Amendment as
equals. Thus, the distinction between capital and non-
capital cases is also without logic or merit.
112 It is recognized that on writs of habeas corpus as well as on writs of certiorari
the Court may consider questions outside of the record. But in the great
majority of all right to counsel cases a period of 10 to 20 years has elapsed since
the trial, in such cases the record is usually all that is available.
113 WEIHOFEN, THE URGE TO PUNISH (1956).
114 VAUGHAN, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY (1948).
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The refusal to recognize the value and need of legal counsel
is particularly anomolous since occasioned by some of the
more erudite members of the legal profession. It would be
incredible to conceive of a group of highly trained doctors
deciding that an untrained person could adequately diagnose
and cure his personal maladies. Yet in law the same person
is held to be sufficiently capable of understanding and em-
ploying the intricacies of substantive and procedural law to
defend himself. Such a holding will not meet the test advo-
cated by James C. Carter in his authoritative writings of the
past century:
This is what I have so often insisted upon as the sole
function both of law and legislation, namely, to
secure to each individual the utmost liberty which he
can enjoy consistently with the preservation of the
like liberty of all others. Liberty, the first of blessings,
the aspiration of every human soul, is the supreme
object. Every abridgement of it demands an excuse
and the only good excuse is the necessity of preserving
it. Whatever tends to preserve this is right, all else
is wrong. 1 15
After balancing the exigencies of the right to counsel and
the exiguous reasons for the exclusion of the right from the
protection of the Fourteenth Amendment it patently appears
that the Court has been guilty of utter apostasy in denying
protection of the right.
Equal Protection
There is another basis, apart from the Due Process Clause,
on which the right to counsel should be recognized and pro-
tected. The Fourteenth Amendment enjoins the States from
denying their citizens equal protection of the laws. Here also
the right is not without its difficulties. There has been great
inconsistency as to whether the protection of this right is
coterminous with that of due process and if not what its pro-
tection is. Chief Justice Taft recognized its purpose thus,
115 CARTER, LAW: IT'S ORIGIN, GROWTH AND FUNCTION (1907),
quoted by ROSCOE POUND, INTERPRETATIONS OF LEGAL
HISTORY (1930).
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"[i]t sought an equality of treatment of all persons, even though
all enjoyed the protection of due process." 11
In this light, it is surprising that the question has not yet
been decided in regard to right to counsel and, in fact, there
is a surprising dearth of case law on the entire question of
poverty and equal protection. Our nation is, however, dedi-
cated to the proposition that all men are created equal. This is
not to be construed as the jejune proposition that men are
created equal in ability but rather that they are equal before the
law, the state and nation exist for them not they for the state
and nation. And no special peculiarity should prevent any
American from the full enjoyment of constitutional privileges,
immunities, due process and equal protection of the laws. If
these are truly our principles, then inability to obtain counsel
(most frequently due to indigence) should never be a reason
for denying the right to counsel. Early in our history poverty
was equated with immorality 117 but this fallacious reasoning
has long since been completely over-ruled 1 18.
Although the Court has never decided the question of
right to counsel as related to equal protection, it has decided a
closely analogous case on this issue. In Griffin v. Illinois, I19
the Court declared that a state denies both equal protection and
due process under the Fourteenth Amendment by administer-
ing appellate review so as to discriminate against indigents by
denying him recourse to appeal. In the circumstances of this
case Griffin needed a transcript as a prerequisite to appeal, if he
had had the money he could have bought it; or if he had been
sentenced to death, or had claimed constitutional error in his
trial, or had claimed error on the face of the record he would
have received his transcript free. But Griffin met none of these
situations, consequently, his appeal was precluded by his lack of
funds. The Court here laid down the clear and simple rule that
poverty alone cannot bar the right of appeal from a criminal
conviction.
116 Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U. S. 312, 333 (1921).
117 City of New York v. Miln, 11 Pet. 102, 142 (1837).
118 Edwards v. California, 314 U. S. 160, 177 (1941).
119 351 U. S. 12 (1956); followed in Burns v. Ohio, 360 U. S. 252 (1959).
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The similarity between the Griffin120 case and the right to
counsel cases is striking; it is difficult to see why the following
statements of the Court should not apply equally to the right to
counsel cases:
There can be no equal justice where the kind of trial
a man gets depends on the amount of money he has. 121
and:
In criminal trials a State can no more discriminate on
account of poverty than on account of religion, race,
or color. 12 2
Thus, it would seem that the denial of counsel, even if equal
denial, is no protection at all and accordingly a denial of equal
protection.123 The requirement of equal protection cannot be
met unless protection is given, this was dearly the purpose of
the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment, some men had been
denied protection prior to its passage and this occasioned the
choice of the word equal,fullwould have served the same.
But at present a latter day Anatole France would be justified
in the repetition of his satirical statement, "[tihe law in its
magnificient equality, forbids the rich as well as the poor to
sleep under bridges, to beg in the streets and to steal bread."
In at least this respect the Court's holdings must be adverse to
the intent of the framers as well as to fundamental principles of
decency.
Projection of the Right
There is at least a strong probability that the right to counsel
will be recognized and protected in the near future. This should
be inevitable to a system of justice which has as its fundamental
philosophy a protection of all its citizens from false or unfair
conviction. But there are grounds for this optimistic belief that
1.20 Griffin v. Illinois, supra note 119.
121 Id. at 19.
12 2 Id. at 17.
1.3 Justice Matthews defined the equal protection clause as "a pledge of the pro-
tection of equal laws." Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 369 (1886).
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go beyond the basic need for the right. The Grifin case, 124 if
analogous, has already established precedent for the inclusion
of the right, at least under the equal protection clause. At least
one judge has arrived at this conclusion:
The analogy to the right to counsel is close indeed:
if a state allows one who can afford to retain a lawyer to
be represented by counsel, and so to obtain a different
kind of trial, it must furnish the same opportunity to
those who are unable to hire a lawyer. Since indigence is
constitutionally an irrelevance, it would seem that a
successful argument might be based upon the pro-
position that the defendant by reason of his poverty is
deprived of a right available to those who can afford to
exercise it. 1 25
Failure to provide an adequate hearing, like the failure to
provide for appeal must now be recognized as contrary to both
due process and equal protection. The number of criminal
cases appealed is relatively small, therefore, the injustice done by
failing to provide for appeal was small but the injustice done by
not providing trial counsel is very great. Can the Court con-
demn the former but condone the latter? To do so would
require a retrogression to legal fiction which no honest, realistic
judge would be willing to recognize. This would be the too
long recognized fiction that due process is unconcerned with
the condition in which a defendant is brought to court so long
as he is brought there at all.
The General Assembly of Georgia unwittingly supplied the
reason why extension of this right must be recognized. In
explaining a resolution condemning the majority Justices of the
Supreme Court for their decisions in a series of individual rights
cases they stated:
The effect of this decision [the Griffin case] is to place
upon each of the states the duty of guaranteeing the
financial ability of every communist and felon to exercise
constitutional rights. 120
124 Griflfin v. Illinois, 351 U. S. 12 (1956).
125 Schaefer, "Federalism and State Criminal Procedure," 70 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 10
(1956).
126 A resolution Requesting Impeachment of Six Members of the United States
Supreme Court, adopted February 22, 1957.
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If this is truly the effect, then the case does indeed fulfill the
constitutional guarantee that everyone, including communists
and felons, have equal protection of the laws.
Another bright spot in the hope for recognition of the right
lies in the consistent striving, by a minority of the Court, for
unqualified recongition of the right to counsel. This minority
may have gained strength in the present Court. While Mr.
Justice Frankfurter continues to be the polestar of thoseJustices
whose judicial lodestone is an ultra-conservative doctrine of
judicial-restraint, the adherents of Mr. Justice Black's view con-
tinue to consider the protection of individual rights as the
Court's highest function. This schism in the Court presently
has Justices Clark and Harlan firmly aligned with Justice Frank-
furter; Justices Douglas, Brennan and Chief Justice Warren
vote with Justice Black. 127 Justices Whittaker and Stewart
cannot accurately be placed in either camp; but it may be signi-
ficant that neither Justice Whittaker nor Justice Stewart have
ever voted against the defendant in a right to counsel case. 12 8
This would appear to offer hope that the balance of the Court
may now be sufficiently reversed to hold the right to counsel a
guaranteed right.
In the present Court it seems apparent that there is at least a
willingness to apply the test laid down in the Betts case 129in a
manner favorable to the defendant. Thus, in Cash v. Culver, 13 o
the denial of counsel was held improper due to questions of the
admissability of evidence and impeachment of prosecution
witnesses which were "beyond the ken of a layman."131 And
in the Spano case 12 the concurring opinions 133 urged that
127 Only Justices Black and Douglas continue to insist that the Fourteenth
Amendment incorporates the Bill of Rights.
128 Mr. Justice Whittaker did vote against the defendant in Crooker v. California,
357 U. S. 433 (1958), but the holding of this case was that due process does
not always require the immediate honoring of a request to obtain one's
own counsel immediately folllwing arrest.
129 Betts v. Brady, 316 U. S. 455 (1942).
13o 358 U. S. 633 (1959).
131 Id. at 638.
132 Spano v. New York, 360 U. S. 315 (1959). The deciding opinion reversed on
the grounds of a coerced confession.
133 Id. at 324, 326. These were by Justice Douglas joined by Justices Black and
Brennan and by Justice Stewat joined by Justices Douglas and Brennan.
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counsel must be present during police interrogation prior to
trial. This, the concurring Justices felt, was necessary to guard
against a "kangaroo court" type of midnight inquisition. These
liberal views raise the question whether the Court will not now
say the same thing in any case where an accused is without
counsel. And if this is now the inevitable result it is enigmatic
that the Court should not finally settle the issue with a holding
parallel to that of the Johnson case. 134 Perhaps the Court fears
the deluge of appeals which would result if such a decision were
given retro-active effect. ' 3 r There may be basis for this fear
but it is inadequate to deny the protection of constitutional
rights.
Conclusion
The present "fair trial" test for the right to counsel is grossly
inadequate and illogical. Despite liberal application of the test
the Court is still not stating the law as it must exist. The
Court can resolve the doubts of many and protect the rights of
all by definitively stating the law through one of two modes.
First, Betts v. Brady136 may be expressly over-ruled. 137
Admittedly stare decisis has great merit in adding certainty and
consistency to our law but it is not an absolutely binding
principle, as ChiefJustice Taney stated the doctrine:
I... am quite willing that it be regarded hereafter
as the law of this court, that its opinion upon the con-
struction of the Constitution is always open to dis-
cussion when it is supposed to have been founded in
error, and that its judicial authority shall hereafter de-
pend altogether on the force of the reasoning by which it
is supported. 13 8
134 Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 455 (1942).
135 See, Schaefer, "Federalism and Criminal Procedure," 70 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 25
(1956).
136 316 U. S. 455 (1942).
137 It is unnecessary for the Court to accept the view ofJustices Black and Douglas
that the Bill of Rights is incorporated in the Fourteenth Amendment. A basic
tenet of both philosophy and logic is that no more is to be accepted than is
necessary to achieve the desired result. Hence, it appears these Justices may be
committing a tactical error in this respect.
138 The Passenger Cases, 7 Howard's Reports 283, 470 (1849).
RIGHT TO COUNSEL
Mr. Justice Brendeis, in 1932, stated the matter with more
explicitness:
The Court bows to the lessons of experience and the
force of better reasoning, recognizing that the process
of trial and error, so fruitful in the physical sciences, is
appropriate also in the judicial function. Ia9
If the Court chooses not to over-rule precedent they may
then employ a type of fiction and find that "fair trial" must in-
dude presence of counsel (unless waived), thereby giving lip
service to the fair trial test. This type of reasoning is well illu-
strated by the efforts of Tom Sawyer and Huck Finn in attempt-
ing to rescuejim. To the uninformed mind of Huck some picks
the boys had found were the proper tools to use but Tom knew
better. From his reading he knew that only case-knives were
used in such instances. So, in deference to proprieties, the boys
began work with the case-knives but after digging till almost
midnight they were tired, their hands were blistered, and they
had made little progress. Then Tom's legal mind perceived an
idea, he dropped his case-knife and firmly told Huck to givehim
a case-knife. As Huck tells the rest:
He had his own by him, but I handed him mine. He
flung it down and says, "Gimme a case-knife."
I didn't know just what to do-but then I thought. I
scratched around amongst the old tools and got a pick-
axe and give it to him, and he took it and went to work
and never said a word.
He was always just that particular. Full of Princple.
Here, Tom had re-emphasized one of the oldest discoveries
of law. The Court may now adhere to prindple--but use the
pickaxe.140 They may adhere to the "fair trial" test but recog-
nize that counsel is essential to a fair trial.
139 Burner v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U. S. 393, dissenting opinion at 407-
408 (1932).
140 Roscoe Pound, "Law In Books And Law in Action," 44 Am. L. Rev. 12
(1910); COHEN AND COHEN, READINGS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND
LEGAL PHILOSOPHY, (1953).
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By either method a desired result will be obtained, at present
the Court is tending toward the latter method but there is hope
that they may soon "call a spade a spade" and attain the more
desirable result by over-ruling the earlier decisions and recog-
nizing the right to counsel.
Such a restatement of the inviolable nature of our funda-
mental rights will aid in assuring the bright future of our demo-
cratic way of life. For, as Nietzsche observed:
Our destiny exercises its influence over us even when,
as yet, we have not learned its nature; it is our future that
lays down the law of our today. 141
241 NIETZSCHE, HUMAN ALL TOO HUMAN, (1878).
